Sunday, December 13, 2009

My Theory...

Professor Johnson said that our last Q&A would be about what our own art theory is, now that we've finished the course. We never got around to doing that, so I thought it would be fitting to end my blog with.

I like the intentionality thesis. I like that it is inclusive. I, for whatever reason, think that art should be art, as long as the artist thinks it is art. I'm not so positive about the observer being able to label something as well as the artist, though.

I also like Danto's theory about having to know art history and theory before you can understand an object as a work of art. I no longer think it is inclusive and elitist, as I think Hume's perfect observer is. I suppose that these two theories are slightly opposed; one is completely inclusive and the other limits art to those who know something about it...

On the other hand, Weitz raises some good objections. Perhaps giving art a definition will limit it for future generations. Though, I suppose we could just include in the definition, "art, thus far..."

Then there's Clive Bell's aesthetic emotion and significant form. I think they're important, even though I think he was confused on how to articulate what they were.

I also think that what Professor Johnson said about creativity is an important factor, even though what exactly creativity is is still up for debate. Johnson & Piper's idea of having a fixed spatiotemporal location is also important.

I'm not sure how to decide which factor takes precedence over the other. Until further notice, Art(Shelby)=?

What has everyone else concluded?

Piper



I thought this was pretty brilliant.

I'm disappointed to end on Piper, though, I suppose because I still cannot fully understand her. I'm also disappointed that this is the only woman we have read this semester. I suppose Piper wouldn't like me saying that (distinguishing her from the other philosopher's we've read, just because she's a woman), but I think it's important to read views from people of all different genders, backgrounds, countries, etc.

I asked about this in class, but for some reason it's still bothering me. Does Piper consider music to be performance art? Let me preface my question...

Performance art is the only art that is at least partially unique because it is unreproducible. It is unreproducible because it contains actual human beings as components. Other works of art are reproducible in that “we have the technological resources to replicate the color, shape, texture, and design of any object we can produce in the first place” (267).

Now, with music, don’t we have the technology to duplicate it? Not just duplicating CDs as Professor Johnson suggested...but don't we have computer technology that can replicate the sounds that are made by instruments? I suppose this would still require human interaction...a human would be needed to press the buttons (say, on an electric keyboard that is making Violin sounds). What if we had a computer with a program written to eliminate the human interaction? Perhaps I'm getting a bit too Sci-Fi.

I think music is different from other types of performance art, like dances and plays. I don't think that a play could be performed the exact same way twice, but I think I song could. Is it the medium of the instrument that makes it reproducible? If so, what of singing? What do you think, is music performance art in the same way that plays and dances are?

Sunday, December 6, 2009

Dickie's response to Weitz

Last Wednesday, as Professor Johnson blogged, Tom Wartenberg suggested that Danto responds to Weitz' views when he discusses Warhol's Brillo box. But the conversation never mentioned Dickie's response to Weitz. Although Dickie never directly responds to Weitz in that he never says Weitz' name, Dickie does respond to some of Weitz' ideas.

Dickie writes that "In the mid-1950's, several philosophers, inspired by Wittgenstein's talk about concepts, began arguing that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for art." Dickie disagrees, and then claims to be able to show the N&S conditions.

More interestingly, though, is Dickie's response to Weitz' idea that any definition of art would be too restrictive and possibly restrain future art. Dickie writes that "some social institutions are formal and some are informal. The artworld could become formalized, and perhaps has been to some extent in certain political contexts, but most people who are interested in art would probably consider this a bad thing. Such formality would threaten the freshness and exuberance of art" (223). Dickie then abruptly changes the subject to the personnel of the art world.

I think that this is a bit of a cop-out of a response. Dickie recognizes the problem, but does not address howa definition of art will not do what Weitz proposes it will do.

Dickie earlier writes that “plays are written to have a place in the theater system and they exist as plays, that is, as art, within that syystem” (221). This means that plays are intended to be art. What, then, of the stone from the driveway that is put on display? The stone was not created with the intention of eventually becoming art.

Response to Stephanie

Thanks, Stephanie, for looking that up. I forgot to do it myself. I'm surprised that the Communist Party didn't have a candidate. Also, perhaps McCain should have thought, "Hmm, the KKK endorses me. Perhaps something is wrong here..." Oh well.

I think that Stephanie's suggestion is right that the reason people who have very slim chances of being nominated president start a campaign is to spread their opinions and hope to get a few followers. I'm not sure how well it works, as I'm sure that the majority of U.S. citizens have never heard most of these candidate's names before. I doubt that they go into their campaign expecting to have a shot at presidency.

I don't think that Dickie's "candidacy" for art is quite as exclusive as running for President, however. I think the word candidacy makes it seem like the chances of becoming actual art are slim. Art seems more inclusive than that. Perhaps Dickie should have chosen another word.

I was certainly put off the first time I read Dickie's "candidacy" line. It seemed a little hazy, but it wasn't until we talked about Dickie in class that I realized that this isn't the only place Dickie was trying to dupe his reader. This made me read Dickie with an even more critical, skeptical eye. During my brief relationship with Philosophy here at MCLA, one of the things I've learned is to be straightforward--to say what I mean, and exactly what I mean, and shut up. Dickie appears to be breaking this cardinal rule.

What does everyone else think about Dickie's "candidacy" premise?

Sunday, November 29, 2009

Response to Michelle Webb -- Thanksgiving Ad

De gustibus non est disputandum -- There is no disputing about taste.

I agree with Michelle in that if you have a certain view about artwork, you should be allowed to hold that view without being forced to think otherwise. I do not think that this applies, however, to PETA's commercial.

Say there was a painting at MoCA that you did not like. That is your taste. Now, if the museum curator came up to you and told you the back story to the painting, and pointed out subtleties in the painting that you had not noticed, perhaps your taste would change. As Professor Johnson said, if you read a book about the Mona Lisa, you're more apt to like and/or appreciate it.

I think that this was all PETA was going for here--to educate people about their cause, in order to let them make their own decision about what they think. Yes, it has shock value, and yes, it is explicit, and these aren't necessarily good qualities of the commercial (I support what PETA stands for, but usually not the way they go about things), but perhaps they are needed to get people's attention. The truth is that nothing in the commercial is exaggerated, and everything the girl says is a fact that most people try to ignore. The more you know about a subject, the better an educated decision you can make about it...whether it's art, or meat, politics, etc. But I would hardly say that this commercial is forcing a view. Many of my non-vegetarian friends who watched this commercial laughed at it and said that they still couldn't wait for their Thanksgiving turkey. I think the hope is that a few people will take the message seriously, perhaps further their education on the subject, and then make an educated decision.

I'm sorry to get off topic of art, but I think it's an important discussion. What are other peoples' thoughts on the commercial?

Duchamp's Fountain



I was curious to see this famous "fountain"...

Dickie

When Dickie is talking about how the status of candidate for appreciation is conferred, he writes that "a number of persons are required to make up the social institution of the artworld, but only one person is required to act on behalf of the artworld and to confer the status of candidate for appreciation. In fact, many works of art are seen only by one person--the one who creates them--but they are still art." (224)

This seems quite inclusive. In fact, I don't see much of a difference between this theory and the Intentionality Thesis. If a 5 year old "sees himself as a member of the artworld" (and is therefore a member), creates a finger painting, and labels it art, then according to what Dickie has just said, this is art. Why, then, go through all of this trouble when his theory simply boils down to IT?

In all of Dickie's other examples of conferring status, the one who confers has the authority to do so (e.g. A king's conferring of knighthood; a minister's pronouncing a couple man and wife. A peasant would not have the authority to knight someone, and any given civilian off the street could not legally marry two people.). What gives any given person the authority to label art as art? Why does Dickie not mention Danto's theory about needing to know the history and theories of art?

Saturday, November 28, 2009

Danto

When I first read Danto, I thought that his theory that one needs to know the theories and history of art in order to understand an object as a work of art was a bit elitist. I thought that art should be something that is accessible to everybody; not just those who are schooled in the subject. However, I now think that this is a pretty necessary condition of establishing something as a work of art.

I don't think that this means one cannot have an opinion or judgment about an object (be it art or not) but rather that when it comes to the actual classification, to leave it up to those who know best. We let those who know science do science, those who know math do math, but for some reason when it comes to the art we are a bit more touchy. A lot of people feel entitled to be in some part involved with art, and I think a lot of people would take offense if told they weren't qualified to call something art. Perhaps science and math are just more concrete than art is.

I think that Danto's observer's are different from Hume's ideal observers because they are more accessible. I still doubt whether there is any such person that would meet Hume's criteria for art observer. The questions still stand, however--how much history and theory does one need to know in order to be qualified? Is it on a continuum, like, "you are x amount qualified to call something art." Is there one person out there who is the most qualified, and (s)he needs to be doing all of the classification for the artworld?

What do you think--does Danto's theory that one needs to know art history and theory in order to understand an object as art seem elitist to you? Are you alright with knowing that you are not qualified to understand art?

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Response to Tasha

Tasha responded to my post, and then asked, "Art may truly need an observer, but does the observer have to be aware that they are filling that role? Could non-sentient observers be viable in this theoretical situation? How would that work?"

I have wondered about sentient life (other than humans) being observers of art, but I have not yet thought about non-sentient life in this role. I think that the purpose of the observer is to reflect upon the art for being art...that is where the observer's purpose comes from. I do not think that non-sentient beings could fulfill the role of an observer because if they cannot reflect upon themselves, then I doubt they could reflect upon a piece of art. Perhaps as far as they would go would be to notice the piece of art as a part of their environment (e.g. they would hear music playing, but recognize it as merely sounds, not art). I think that perhaps art does need an observer, that is, someone to appreciate, reflect and place value upon it. Without an observer, art is...well, meaningless color on a board.

So, taking this a step closer, could sentient life (not humans) play the role of observer for a work of art? What if, in the Last Man Experiment, only humans had died off, and other sentient life still existed? Could non-humans play the role of observers, thus making art, art?

Goodman

Goodman's claim that "a stone is normally no work of art while in the driveway, but may be so when on display in an art museum" (202) does not sit well with me. A stone is a stone is a stone, in both environments. I might actually argue that the stone is more aesthetic in a driveway, or on a mountainside, as that is it's natural environment.

Goodman's reasoning is that a stone in a driveway is found art, which doesn't symbolize anything, but a stone in a museum exemplifies its properties of shape, color, size, etc. However--does this rock not have the same internal properties whether it is lying on the ground or on a pedestal in a museum?

This makes me think about a few things I've been learning about value in my Environmental Ethics class.

Firstly:
We talked about a rock having "primary qualities" -- an inherent, determinate length, height, mass, etc...the same as Goodman's driveway stone. We asked if the fact that this rock has these qualities demand anything of us morally. Similarly--does the fact that this rock has these qualities demand anything from us aesthetically?

Also:
It seems as if, according to Goodman (and many other theories we have read), art needs an observer. I don't think that we have yet heard a theory which claims art to be intrinsically valuable. In Environmental Ethics, we questioned if the environment was inherently valuable, or simply instrumentally valuable to humans. We read a thought experiment, dubbed the "last man experiment" which seems to show that many people find the environment intrinsically valuable...I thought I might apply this experiment to art (I paraphrase Jamieson in his book, Ethics and the Environment, p. 74):

Suppose that Fred is the last sentient creature on the plant and he knows that, for whatever reason, sentient life will never again appear on this planet. Just before exiting the scene, Fred blows up every museum on the planet and destroys every piece of artwork that ever existed. What Fred destroys is of great beauty, but he defends his action by saying that it doesn't matter, since it will never again be appreciated or valued by anyone.

My question to you, again paraphrased from Jamieson:
Do we accept Fred's justification, or was his act wrong?

Saturday, November 14, 2009

Response to Alyson Carey

This week, Alyson asked, "Is there a set standard for taste?"

Hume writes that "it is natural for us to seep a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, conforming one sentiment, and condemning another" (42).

What I've read of my book review book (Taste: The Secret Meaning of Things, by Stephen Bayley) so far suggests a few things about the standard of taste. Firstly, we are all influenced by the taste of our times. Norman Bel Geddes suggests that if Keats had been writing during the 1940s, his famous poem would have written about an automobile or plane, rather than the Grecian Urn. Bayley claims that money and taste are inseparable, as are class and taste. Finally, according the Bayley, "the one certain thing about taste is that it changes."

My answer to this question is that no, there is not a set standard for taste. I agree with the statement Hume alludes to and disagrees with -- that there is no disputing about taste. Yes, tastes do change and rely on multiple factors such as education, class, status, wealth, and country of origin...but to set a standard for taste, in my opinion, would be impossible and pointless.

Hume

When I researched Hume in the Stanford online dictionary of philosophy (), I thought some of his ideas were pretty interesting. One of the things I found most interesting was Hume's "copy principle," which I think is pretty confusing, but might still apply to what we've read about Hume and art. I will try to paraphrase...

Perceptions come in two different types: ideas (more feeble) and impressions. Hume's copy principle says that complex ideas are composed of simple ideas, which are in turn faint copies of simple impressions from which they are derived, to which they correspond and resemble. He then provides the "missing shade of blue" contradiction, which I think discredits the entire principle, but nevertheless...

Hume then applies this principle (in reverse) to definitions. He thought that in order to define, you needed to "pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy." You begin with the term, then ask yourself what term is annexed to it. If there is none, then the term has no cognitive content. If there is, you break that into simple ideas and trace it back to its original impressions.

I wish Hume had talked about this explicitly when he discussed art. Hume doesn't even attempt to define art, he simply presents the reader with his antinomy, and then proceeds to explain art as an object of taste. I think that if Hume had applied his reverse copy principle in an attempt to define art, this essay would have had more substance.

Hume alludes to the saying, "There is no disputing about taste," and seems to disagree with it. He says that if one has a taste that is clearly inferior, "no one pays attention to such a taste..." (43) This has not convinced me--do you think Hume is wrong to dismiss others' tastes?

Sunday, November 1, 2009

Response to Fay Bartow

Fay asked: Can aesthetic emotion actually become a common emotion--can it wear its significance out?

I actually think that an aesthetic emotion is a common emotion. I suspect that John Dewey would certainly agree with me. Fay says that common emotions are those that we come in contact with every day...I think the same can be said for aesthetic emotions. As Professor Johnson said, seeing that one dirty fork left in the sink of an otherwise perfectly clean kitchen can be considered an aesthetic emotion, and it is certainly a common emotion (I wish my kitchen sink only had one dirty fork...).

I also think that aesthetic emotion, like other common emotions, is something that can be exercised. That is to say--you aren't born with a certain amount of love, which you use up and then you're out of love. When you love, you generate more love, and act more lovingly. By exercising an emotion, you create more of it, rather than using it up. I think this can certainly be applied to aesthetic emotions.

Moving to Weitz...
What do you think about Weitz's view that there are no necessary and sufficient attributes of art, but you can recognize it when you see it? ...That, *this*, *this*, *this*, and 'similar things' are art? Is this a satisfactory explanation for you?

Saturday, October 31, 2009

Weitz


Weitz writes that "some games resemble others in some respects--that is all. What we find are no necessary and sufficient properties, only a 'complicated network of similarities and crisscrossing,' such that we say of games that they form a family with family resemblances and no common trait" (190).

This had me thinking--what's so wrong about "strands of similarities?"

I'm not sure if this example will hold water with anyone, but the first thing that came to mind was the computer game, "The Logical Journey of the Zoombinis." There was one part of the game where you had to sit Zoombinis (those cute little things in above picture) in seats along the perimeter of a boat. This has a point, I promise. You could only sit two Zoombinis next to each other if they had at least one similar trait (ponytail, purple nose, sunglasses, etc.) So, when you were finished, there were 20 or so Zoombinis in a circle, and every Zoombini had a trait similar to the Zoombini on the left and right of him.

Now, it was also possible that any two random Zoombinis in your group (not sitting next to each other, of course) had no similar traits. You could have a girl with a ponytail, sunglasses, a red nose, and a spring, and a boy with spikey hair, one eye, an orange nose, and rollerblades--nothing similar, other than being Zoombinis. Now, let's throw a third Zoombini in--he has one little tuft of hair, an orange nose, tired eyes, and a spring. Now these three Zoombinis all share "strands of similarities." Stick with me here.

Let's apply this to games. This complicates matters because traits of a game are more complex than just color and hairstyle. Let's take Chess and the hand game Miss Mary Mack. Let's say that they have no similar traits, other than being games. Then, add Monopoly to the mix...and say that Monopoly and Chess share some similarities, and Miss Mary Mack and Monopoly share some similarities. If we somehow know that Miss Mary Mack and Chess are games, but don't know that Monopoly is a game, then we could infer that because Monopoly shares characteristics with other games, it too is a game.

This seems to be what Weitz means when he says, "If one asks what a game is, we pick out sample games, describe these, and add, 'This and similar things are called games'." As we said in class, we would need to clarify what "similar things" are. It's easy enough to say that traditional things like Chess and Monopoly are games, but what about more obscure things like mind games, or animals seemingly playing games? Where do you draw the line?

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Response to William Trial

This week, William asked: "Since animals and humans are related on a similar basis, who proclaims that animals cannot produce works of art such as humans do?" I think that what William is really asking here is not who thinks this way, but how those who do justify their thinking.

I am interested in this question because I am learning about similar problems in my Environmental Ethics course. I think the main problem here is that people often forget that humans are animals too. Dale Jamieson, the author of my Environmental Ethics text, writes that "we are not only rational agents but also animals, and in virtue of this we have an animal nature" (Ethics and the Environment 98). By animal nature, Jamieson means things like human love for food and drink, sex, curiosity, etc. He goes on to say that "since we value the goods that flow from our animal nature, we are committed to valuing these goods when they are instatiated in other creatures as well...if we value our own appreciation of art, then we are also committed to valuing a dog's appreciation of (what are to him) interesting smells, and a monkey's valuing of swinging from trees" (99).

I think that Jamieson misses something here...we are also committed to valuing an animal's appreciation of art. I think that, as Professor Johnson proposed in class, the ability to desire and appreciate aesthetically pleasing things appears at the same time that animals have a sense of self.

What does everyone else think about this? Another thought--how does the intentionality thesis apply to animals?

John Dewey

Wartenberg's introduction to Dewey states that "an important feature of [Dewey's definition of art] is that it unites various aspects of art often treated as distinct. For example, both artist and audience play equally important roles in this definition" (Wartenberg 137). I did not find this idea while reading Dewey's work. I thought that Dewey's roles for the observer/audience were somewhat vague or even contradictory. When I asked about this in class, Professor Johnson clarified it a bit for me (it's not contradictory, it's just on a continuum...), but I am still a little confused.

The formula for the Intentionality Thesis that we have been working with is

A= I
a or o

where I=intention, A=artist and O=observer. On pages 140 and 143, Dewey seems to remove the "O" from this formula. Thus, the role of the observer is downplayed, and art is only art when the
artist intends it to be so. However, on page 145, Dewey says that "to be truly artistic, a work must also be esthetic--that is, framed for enjoyed receptive perception." This seems to mean that a work of art needs an observer to appreciate it. This is why I am confused.

Can anyone help me out here? What is your take on the role of the observer/audience in Dewey's theory of art?

Sunday, October 18, 2009

Response to Michelle Webb

This week, Michelle asked, "All theory aside, what is art to you?"

I can't believe I haven't asked myself this question since this class began. I guess I've been too caught up in all of the different views to sit down and consider my own.

In middle school, I went to a tiny arts school called the Museum Partnership School. The building was run down, the paint was falling off the ceiling onto our books--scratch that, we didn't have money for books--and there were about 40 kids in my grade level. Since we didn't have much money, (I learned then that the state cares more about MCAS scores than our "alternative" methods of learning) our teachers came up with some pretty unorthodox teaching methods. I haven't really actively learned anything about art since my two years there, before this class.

The question, "What is art?" was raised pretty much daily at MPS. I think my definition of art then and my definition of art now are the same, albeit terribly clichéd...

I think that art is any form of expression. We talked about catharsis in class, and I think that all forms of catharsis are art. This is a pretty inclusive definition, but I think that it is in the nature of art to be inclusive. Why do we have to be art snobs, anyway? If someone wants to paint a barely visible diagonal line on a white canvas and call it art, it's not going to hurt anyone to agree that it is art. I'm suppose I am a full supporter of the intentionality thesis.

An unrelated question:
Clive Bell writes that "A good critic may be able to make me see in a picture that had left me cold things that I had overlooked, till at last, receiving the emotion, I recognise it as a work of art. ...But it is useless for a critic to tell me that something is a work of art; he must make me feel it for myself" (119). Do you agree with this?

Clive Bell

Professor Johnson's latest blog post has to do with the circularity of significant form and aesthetic emotion. Since we cannot come up with a good definition for significant form without being circular, Professor Johnson proposes that we leave significant form undefined. This, however, would reduce Bell's thesis to two "apparently insignificant claims:

*All and only those objects with some unknown property are art.

Or

*All and only those objects that evoke some unknown aesthetic emotional reaction are art."

I do not understand how Bell could fail to provide adequate definitions for the two crucial components of his thesis. He must have noticed their circularity, though he does not mention it (at least not in our excerpt).

Perhaps Bell's vague, "unknown" thesis is telling of his formalist view. The question frequently came up in class this week, "Then what is art to Bell?" If you take away the details, the representation, and the form from art...what are you left with? A blank canvas? That canvas still has form, because it's still a three dimensional object with lines. It still represents blankness, or fog, or purity. So we take the canvas away and are left with...nothing? I'm not sure that Clive Bell knows what we are left with. Perhaps this is why he gives us, as Professor Johnson writes, "unknown aesthetic emotional reactions" and "unknown properties."

I've wrapped my mind around Clive Bell's art views in theory, but I cannot think of how to put them to use. I had a similar problem with Plato. I suppose I just do not understand what is so bad about representation.

Question:
We did not get around to suggesting formulas for Clive Bell's view of art in class. Does anyone have a try?

Sunday, October 11, 2009

Response to Fay Bartow

In her blog this week, Fay asked: is it necessary for one to understand the message of an artwork?

I used to think that the interpretation of art was subjective. If someone read a poem, they could rightly take out of it whatever they pleased. However, I was discussing this with a friend this summer, and he made me think otherwise...

My friend told me of an English class he once had, where a student believed that all that mattered was how the reader interpreted the story. My friend's teacher responded by asking if it would be correct, when he read To Kill A Mockingbird, to conclude that Tom Robinson deserved his punishment. After all, Robinson was tried by a jury of his peers, and was attempting to escape prison. Though he could support his reasoning, was it correct to conclude this?

It seems to me that this is very incorrect, as it is not at all what Harper Lee intended. So in response to Fay's question -- yes, I think it is extremely necessary to understand the message in a piece of art. In fact, I think the message and the interpretation and understanding of the message is one of the most crucial aspects of art.

That being said, I think that often times the message of a work of art gets lost. Does this mean that the artist is failing, or that the observer is failing?

Freud

Freud suggests that artists disguise the fantasies that are behind their works of art, which then allows observers to enjoy their own fantasies through the work without feeling ashamed. This seems to be a plausible theory, but I have one problem with it -- the role of interpretation.

Let's say an artist fantasizes about owning a fast car and a big house. She then creates an abstract painting (no obvious cars or houses depicted) that expresses her fantasy. An observer sees the painting, and then enjoys his fantasy of living on the beach. The message, or emotion, has gotten lost in translation. According to Tolstoy this means that the artist has failed, but Freud says nothing of this dilemma. Perhaps I am missing the point, and because all of this interpretation is happening subconsciously, it does not matter that the fantasy be accurately conveyed.

In class this week, we talked about catharsis in the art world. We discussed art as a "release valve," or a sort of substitute for humans' more animalistic drives. It seems as if all humans would need some form of catharsis in their lives. This makes me wonder: is art the only kind of catharsis? And if so, does this mean that all humans are artists?

Sunday, October 4, 2009

Response to Gloria Statwick

In her post, Gloria asked: "Can one being exactly convey their feelings to another being?" I think that she is right in saying that this is not possible. Different factors can bring us closer to conveying exact meaning: our relationship with the person with whom we are communicating the feeling to; the amount of thought we put into the communication; the form in which we communicate; etc.

I think a good analogy to this is reading a descriptive paragraph about, say, a couple walking down a beach. The author can use as many vivid descriptions and adjectives as she wants to describe the waves, and the sand, and the trees, and the people, and yet I am quite sure that the exact mental image that the reader gets is different from every person who reads the paragraph. However, with art, the image is already painted by the artist, and therefore the exact way that the artist is feeling is transferred to the canvas. I think that the problem lies in the transfer of emotion from the canvas to the observer. There are so many different ways to interpret a piece of art that I think the original feeling often gets lost or skewed by the observer.

This makes me wonder--would feelings perhaps be best expressed through both art and words?

Tolstoy

This week, we spoke about Tolstoy's view that "art is one of the most necessary means of communication, without which man cannot live." I am not sure that he has me convinced of this. We discussed the possibility that this could just be hyperbole, (Socrates didn't say "the unexamined life cannot be lived," but, "the unexamined life is not worth living"--perhaps "a life without art is not worth living" is what Tolstoy means here?) but for the sake of this post I will take Tolstoy's claim literally.

The reason that Tolstoy believes that humanity would cease to live is because it would do away with one of our primary forms of communication. Tolstoy believes that art is a language--the language with which we communicate feelings--whereas words are the language with which we communicate thoughts. Without the communication of feelings, we would degenerate as a species. I think it is clear that without some form of art we would certainly not be the same species that we are today, but I do not think that we would cease to exist altogether. Tolstoy also neglects the fact that emotions are not solely expressed through art--they can be expressed through words arguably as well.

This leads to my question--are feelings best expressed through words or art?

Sunday, September 27, 2009

Response to Natasha Robinson

In her blog this week, Natasha asked: "is it not the intent of art to connect observers with the artwork and object represented?" We have spoken a lot in class about defining art, but have not quite delved into the subject of the intention of art. I think that what Natasha is asking is just one of many possible intentions that a work of art could have.

I do not think that the intent of art is to connect observers with the artwork and represented object, so much as it is to connect observers to the feeling that the art produces. If we look at Tolstoy (am I getting ahead of myself here?), he believes that art is a form of communication, almost a language, that conveys a past feeling of the artist to the observer. I do not agree with Tolstoy that beauty and pleasure has no significance in the art world, but I do agree that feeling, both of the artist and the observer, is a major component of art's intent.

The Sincerest Form of Flattery

We have all heard Colton's famous saying, "imitation is the sincerest form of flattery." Though I think this is usually used ironically, I wonder what Plato would think about this saying. I suppose that it does not matter that the Forms are flattered, but perhaps this says something about the nature of art. If art is attempting to sincerely imitate the Forms and truly tap into them, I do not see how that can be a bad thing.

Plato said that "music is the highest philosophy" because it is the most tapped into the Forms and does not imitate anything. If that is the case, is it the mere imitation of a Form or object that Plato has a problem with? I wonder what Plato would think of the white canvas used in our book's introduction, or a Jackson Pollack painting.

If Plato did not want art in his Republic because art is an imitation of an imitation, I think it would follow that Plato would not want the imitation, the object, either. It seems like Plato makes no objection to having beds in his Republic. I suppose this is simply because living in a world without objects would be impractical.

My unrelated question: In class on Wednesday, we talked about how humans are inclined to look for representation in things (clouds, a Pollack painting, etc.), even when there is no intended representation. Why would an artist want not to represent something, and do you think an artist would intentionally not represent something, knowing/hoping that the observers would make their own representations?

Sunday, September 20, 2009

Response to Fay Bartow

In her blog this week, Fay posed the question, "What makes art so appealing?" This makes me wonder--why are certain media, and certain genres within these media, more widely appealing than others?

I bet that there are very few people who are not attracted to at least one genre of art. Cubism may not be for everybody, but perhaps some other genre is appealing, even if it is not as widely recognized as art--a film; a beautifully landscaped lawn; a decorated room; a particularly clever sequence of moves in a chess game.

This leads me to wonder--is there a difference between being attracted to art, and being aesthetically attracted to something? I'm getting off topic.

I think that Fay may have briefly touched upon one answer to her own question. She writes that "art invokes all various types of emotions within us." I think that we, as humans, like things that we can relate to-- things that make us feel happy, or sad, or thoughtful, and I think both the creation and appreciation of art is a perfect outlet for this. However, why people prefer certain genres over others, I think, is a matter of personal preference.

Friday, September 18, 2009

Representation

For Spring Break of last year, my friend and I went to Montreal. We found an advertisement for (pardon my lack of accents) La Musee d'art contemporain de Montreal -- The Contemporary Art Museum of Montreal. The admission was only $3 on Wednesdays so we decided to check it out. The featured artist was Claude Tousignant, an abstract painter and sculptor who was born in Montreal. Here's some of his work:



As we were walking around trying to make some sort of sense as to what the artist was trying to convey to his audience, we entered a room filled entirely with huge monochrome canvases. Sitting before a large, entirely yellow canvas, was a woman on a bench, staring at the painting, lost in thought. My friend and I could not help but giggle -- What did this woman see in this entirely yellow painting?

I think this is relevant to the discussion we had yesterday about the importance of representation. I feel as though representation is a crucial aspect of art. I'll use literature as an example--a writer can simply state exactly what she means, or she can disguise it in a carefully constructed metaphor. I think that the art in literature lies not in the idea, but in the way the idea is expressed and what it represents. So perhaps, in that way, an all yellow canvas is representational. Tousignant could have just written "HAPPINESS" or "SUNSHINE" or whatever he was trying to represent on the canvas.

My question for this blog is: does representation, like the intentionality thesis, play a role in defining art as art? That is, is it necessary for a work of art to represent something?