Friday, March 26, 2010

Animals as Property

Here's my paper for the course. For some reason the footnotes didn't copy/paste over.


Humans cannot rightfully be the owners of animals. By “rightful,” I mean that humans do not have a morally valid claim to call animals their property or to enact legislation that makes animals their property. By “owners” of an animal, I mean people who have the right to possess, control, breed, sell, and decide the fate of an animal. This is similar to our society’s widespread belief that humans cannot be the property of other humans.

The law and legal systems have contributed to the way that humans think of animals as their property. In common and civil law, there are two entities: persons and things. In law, animals are considered things and not persons, and are therefore able to be the property of humans. As Professor Reinold Noyes writes, “legal relations in our law exist only between persons. There cannot be a legal relation between a person and a thing or between two things.” This is a major reason that animals are treated as property in our society.

One example of animals being treated as property in the courtroom is the case of DeSanctis v. Pritchard, in which a married couple had a pet dog named Barney. The couple divorced, and court decided that Barney would become the property of the wife, but allowed the husband the right to visit the dog. However, when the wife moved away and the husband could not see Barney anymore, he sued for partial custody. The judge ruled that visitation agreement for a dog was “like a visitation agreement for a table or a lamp,” and denied the husband’s request.

There are also historical, cultural, religious, and economic reasons for considering animals the property of humans. Humans have considered animals as property for so long that many people never stop to consider it. Many religions and belief systems proclaim that humans are superior and nonhumans are inferior. Additionally, “animal exploitation is a billion-dollar industry – and human beings appear to be able to justify most actions that result in monetary gain.”

However, animals are different from property because they are alive and sentient. Though sentience is an area of contention in the animal rights debate, it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue it and for the purpose of this thesis I will assume that animals are sentient.

Animals are already treated somewhat differently from other forms of property through legislation like anti-cruelty laws. While someone can do whatever she pleases with a table that she owns, even punch it or break it in two if she is angry, she could not legally do this to an animal. People are not allowed to torture, neglect, or kill animals in any way that is inhumane or unnecessary. In fact, every state now has a law that protects animals from unnecessary cruelty.
However, “almost every such statute contains specific exemptions for virtually all forms of institutionalized animal exploitation, such as the use of animals for food, scientific experiments, hunting and trapping.” The problem is that what constitutes “unnecessary cruelty” is an ambiguous term. Francione writes, “as long as we accept that it is morally permissible for humans to eat nonhumans, then, if the dehorning or castration of animals is what is thought to make the animal more fit for that human use, the conduct will be deemed as ‘necessary’.”

This is not to say that one cannot rightfully be the guardian or caregiver to an animal. Because humans are more advanced, they can do things in the interest of the animals who cannot think into the future and therefore cannot provide for themselves as well as humans can provide for them. People have duties and obligations towards animals of whom they are caregivers, but being in charge of an animal is different from owning one. Also, changing the property status of animals would not prevent people from having pets. There are some states that have changed the terminology in their legislation from being the “owner” of an animal to a “guardian” of an animal, which might signal a movement away from the idea of animals as property.

I suspect that there is an increasing level of obligation with ownership. Non-living things like cars and books have indirect links to life; for example, one has obligations to drive a car carefully because a crash may kill someone. Owning land is a direct link with life and therefore one more step of responsibility. A step beyond that would be owning an animal, and the furthest step would be owning a fellow human. In cases of humans owning humans, though they were both the same species, the owner believed or convinced himself that the humans he owned were somehow below him. In our society, we view humans owning humans as wrong and immoral, but most fail to see how similar this is to humans owning animals.

One may object to this thesis by saying that animals are not persons because they lack certain important qualities like self-reflection, language, etc. Since our legal system includes only two entities – persons and things – and animals are not persons, then they are things.

I do not think that animals should be awarded the exact same rights that humans have (as Peter Singer wrote: “Since a pig can’t vote, it is meaningless to talk of its right to vote.”) , but perhaps there should be a new entity created in our legal system, so as to include persons, animals, and then things.

Additionally, in regards to those qualities which would make animals non-persons, there are certain humans who also lack these qualities (people in vegetative states, people with severe brain injury, etc.). However, because these humans are humans, they are considered to be persons by most, and are certainly not owned by anyone.