Saturday, October 31, 2009

Weitz


Weitz writes that "some games resemble others in some respects--that is all. What we find are no necessary and sufficient properties, only a 'complicated network of similarities and crisscrossing,' such that we say of games that they form a family with family resemblances and no common trait" (190).

This had me thinking--what's so wrong about "strands of similarities?"

I'm not sure if this example will hold water with anyone, but the first thing that came to mind was the computer game, "The Logical Journey of the Zoombinis." There was one part of the game where you had to sit Zoombinis (those cute little things in above picture) in seats along the perimeter of a boat. This has a point, I promise. You could only sit two Zoombinis next to each other if they had at least one similar trait (ponytail, purple nose, sunglasses, etc.) So, when you were finished, there were 20 or so Zoombinis in a circle, and every Zoombini had a trait similar to the Zoombini on the left and right of him.

Now, it was also possible that any two random Zoombinis in your group (not sitting next to each other, of course) had no similar traits. You could have a girl with a ponytail, sunglasses, a red nose, and a spring, and a boy with spikey hair, one eye, an orange nose, and rollerblades--nothing similar, other than being Zoombinis. Now, let's throw a third Zoombini in--he has one little tuft of hair, an orange nose, tired eyes, and a spring. Now these three Zoombinis all share "strands of similarities." Stick with me here.

Let's apply this to games. This complicates matters because traits of a game are more complex than just color and hairstyle. Let's take Chess and the hand game Miss Mary Mack. Let's say that they have no similar traits, other than being games. Then, add Monopoly to the mix...and say that Monopoly and Chess share some similarities, and Miss Mary Mack and Monopoly share some similarities. If we somehow know that Miss Mary Mack and Chess are games, but don't know that Monopoly is a game, then we could infer that because Monopoly shares characteristics with other games, it too is a game.

This seems to be what Weitz means when he says, "If one asks what a game is, we pick out sample games, describe these, and add, 'This and similar things are called games'." As we said in class, we would need to clarify what "similar things" are. It's easy enough to say that traditional things like Chess and Monopoly are games, but what about more obscure things like mind games, or animals seemingly playing games? Where do you draw the line?

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Response to William Trial

This week, William asked: "Since animals and humans are related on a similar basis, who proclaims that animals cannot produce works of art such as humans do?" I think that what William is really asking here is not who thinks this way, but how those who do justify their thinking.

I am interested in this question because I am learning about similar problems in my Environmental Ethics course. I think the main problem here is that people often forget that humans are animals too. Dale Jamieson, the author of my Environmental Ethics text, writes that "we are not only rational agents but also animals, and in virtue of this we have an animal nature" (Ethics and the Environment 98). By animal nature, Jamieson means things like human love for food and drink, sex, curiosity, etc. He goes on to say that "since we value the goods that flow from our animal nature, we are committed to valuing these goods when they are instatiated in other creatures as well...if we value our own appreciation of art, then we are also committed to valuing a dog's appreciation of (what are to him) interesting smells, and a monkey's valuing of swinging from trees" (99).

I think that Jamieson misses something here...we are also committed to valuing an animal's appreciation of art. I think that, as Professor Johnson proposed in class, the ability to desire and appreciate aesthetically pleasing things appears at the same time that animals have a sense of self.

What does everyone else think about this? Another thought--how does the intentionality thesis apply to animals?

John Dewey

Wartenberg's introduction to Dewey states that "an important feature of [Dewey's definition of art] is that it unites various aspects of art often treated as distinct. For example, both artist and audience play equally important roles in this definition" (Wartenberg 137). I did not find this idea while reading Dewey's work. I thought that Dewey's roles for the observer/audience were somewhat vague or even contradictory. When I asked about this in class, Professor Johnson clarified it a bit for me (it's not contradictory, it's just on a continuum...), but I am still a little confused.

The formula for the Intentionality Thesis that we have been working with is

A= I
a or o

where I=intention, A=artist and O=observer. On pages 140 and 143, Dewey seems to remove the "O" from this formula. Thus, the role of the observer is downplayed, and art is only art when the
artist intends it to be so. However, on page 145, Dewey says that "to be truly artistic, a work must also be esthetic--that is, framed for enjoyed receptive perception." This seems to mean that a work of art needs an observer to appreciate it. This is why I am confused.

Can anyone help me out here? What is your take on the role of the observer/audience in Dewey's theory of art?