Friday, March 26, 2010

Animals as Property

Here's my paper for the course. For some reason the footnotes didn't copy/paste over.


Humans cannot rightfully be the owners of animals. By “rightful,” I mean that humans do not have a morally valid claim to call animals their property or to enact legislation that makes animals their property. By “owners” of an animal, I mean people who have the right to possess, control, breed, sell, and decide the fate of an animal. This is similar to our society’s widespread belief that humans cannot be the property of other humans.

The law and legal systems have contributed to the way that humans think of animals as their property. In common and civil law, there are two entities: persons and things. In law, animals are considered things and not persons, and are therefore able to be the property of humans. As Professor Reinold Noyes writes, “legal relations in our law exist only between persons. There cannot be a legal relation between a person and a thing or between two things.” This is a major reason that animals are treated as property in our society.

One example of animals being treated as property in the courtroom is the case of DeSanctis v. Pritchard, in which a married couple had a pet dog named Barney. The couple divorced, and court decided that Barney would become the property of the wife, but allowed the husband the right to visit the dog. However, when the wife moved away and the husband could not see Barney anymore, he sued for partial custody. The judge ruled that visitation agreement for a dog was “like a visitation agreement for a table or a lamp,” and denied the husband’s request.

There are also historical, cultural, religious, and economic reasons for considering animals the property of humans. Humans have considered animals as property for so long that many people never stop to consider it. Many religions and belief systems proclaim that humans are superior and nonhumans are inferior. Additionally, “animal exploitation is a billion-dollar industry – and human beings appear to be able to justify most actions that result in monetary gain.”

However, animals are different from property because they are alive and sentient. Though sentience is an area of contention in the animal rights debate, it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue it and for the purpose of this thesis I will assume that animals are sentient.

Animals are already treated somewhat differently from other forms of property through legislation like anti-cruelty laws. While someone can do whatever she pleases with a table that she owns, even punch it or break it in two if she is angry, she could not legally do this to an animal. People are not allowed to torture, neglect, or kill animals in any way that is inhumane or unnecessary. In fact, every state now has a law that protects animals from unnecessary cruelty.
However, “almost every such statute contains specific exemptions for virtually all forms of institutionalized animal exploitation, such as the use of animals for food, scientific experiments, hunting and trapping.” The problem is that what constitutes “unnecessary cruelty” is an ambiguous term. Francione writes, “as long as we accept that it is morally permissible for humans to eat nonhumans, then, if the dehorning or castration of animals is what is thought to make the animal more fit for that human use, the conduct will be deemed as ‘necessary’.”

This is not to say that one cannot rightfully be the guardian or caregiver to an animal. Because humans are more advanced, they can do things in the interest of the animals who cannot think into the future and therefore cannot provide for themselves as well as humans can provide for them. People have duties and obligations towards animals of whom they are caregivers, but being in charge of an animal is different from owning one. Also, changing the property status of animals would not prevent people from having pets. There are some states that have changed the terminology in their legislation from being the “owner” of an animal to a “guardian” of an animal, which might signal a movement away from the idea of animals as property.

I suspect that there is an increasing level of obligation with ownership. Non-living things like cars and books have indirect links to life; for example, one has obligations to drive a car carefully because a crash may kill someone. Owning land is a direct link with life and therefore one more step of responsibility. A step beyond that would be owning an animal, and the furthest step would be owning a fellow human. In cases of humans owning humans, though they were both the same species, the owner believed or convinced himself that the humans he owned were somehow below him. In our society, we view humans owning humans as wrong and immoral, but most fail to see how similar this is to humans owning animals.

One may object to this thesis by saying that animals are not persons because they lack certain important qualities like self-reflection, language, etc. Since our legal system includes only two entities – persons and things – and animals are not persons, then they are things.

I do not think that animals should be awarded the exact same rights that humans have (as Peter Singer wrote: “Since a pig can’t vote, it is meaningless to talk of its right to vote.”) , but perhaps there should be a new entity created in our legal system, so as to include persons, animals, and then things.

Additionally, in regards to those qualities which would make animals non-persons, there are certain humans who also lack these qualities (people in vegetative states, people with severe brain injury, etc.). However, because these humans are humans, they are considered to be persons by most, and are certainly not owned by anyone.

11 comments:

  1. “...every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will...Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves.”

    This is a quote by Kant; and we see again his insistence that rational is the determining factor to exist as an end-in-itself. I think Kant was wrong in this thinking; but notice what happens when rational is not the deciding factor--omit the word “rational” or replace with ‘sentient’ and animals are now ends rather than means. Also, Kant recognizes that the relational properties of animals are artificial and man-made-he clearly states that animals existence depends on nature, yet he does not allow animals free will absent what he calls “rational”.

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  2. The ownership of animals does not imply, entail, or legally bind, an owner to recognize an animal’s inherent dignitary interests, whereas the principle of legal guardianship means precisely all those things. For instance, we do not own children; we provide for their well-being. [The nurturance we speak of here is in the child's or animal's interests as an intrinsically valuable being--not a relational thing subject to exploitation. For example a farmer might treat his/her pigs decently and nurture them to a degree, but this is not in the interest of an animal as animal but animal as commodity.] I agree strongly with your thesis statement; and I think we can provide even more distinctions between “owner’ and “guardian” that might help to clearly identify the differences in terms. You mention that owners have “the right to possess, control, breed, sell, and decide the fate of an animal.” But, legal guardians will also have the right to possession, and control to a degree, and decisions (both positive and possibly illness related) made by a guardian in the animal’s interest might decide the “fate” of the animal. Owners of animals can and willfully do exploit them for many reasons, breeding and selling as you mention, food and clothing, labor, entertainment, and more. But a legal guardian cannot (legally) exploit what they are guardians of; in the obvious case a parent cannot exploit a child. So, I think your thesis is rock solid and sound. You present many contentious issues that make for a challenging and interesting paper; topics that I think will encourage (and even provoke) a response..

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  3. Shelby, as a sort of thought experiment: do you think it’s possible to extend the “duties and obligations” you mention to animals of whom we are not explicit guardians? In some states, such as New York it is unlawful to hit a cat, dog, horse, or cattle and flee the scene. Given Gary Francione’s views about sentience being the determining factor for an animal’s basic right to live: can we make distinctions here in the case of wild and domesticated animals? For instance, if I hit a wolf, am I indebted to the wolf, as I am to a person or a domestic pet? Must I stop and make a reasonable effort to provide care? (Call wildlife rescue, etc) and might I be held liable if I do not stop upon hitting a wild animal? My own view is that I have a moral obligation to do what I can to aid the wolf, though it was an accident, it was my car that hit the wolf; and I want to avoid becoming desensitized to life and death situations; so my direct participation in the experience requires sensitivity and awareness-both paramount in this situation and I think applicable to other experiences as well.

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  4. Great comments Keane, thanks. I'm interested in examining the owner/guardian distinction further...for example, what would constitute exploitation? Would a farmer using a horse to plow his field be considered using the animal as commodity as opposed to animal as animal? This is different, of course, with your example of a farmer with pigs, since I assume the pigs would be slaughtered. I think it must be possible, though, to work harmoniously with animals without exploiting them.

    In regards to your thought experiment, I think this would certainly be possible, though maybe more difficult to argue. To me, since it is illegal to hit a human and flee the scene, this should apply to animals as well.

    I suppose it may be easier to argue for the case of domesticated animals; they "belong" to someone (excuse my scare quotes) and by hitting them and fleeing the scene, one would be doing an injustice to the animal's owner. I agree with your view and reasoning on this same situation with wild animals, including of course that the wolf is sentient, and the whole argument that goes along with that.

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  5. I think that you're question about the farmer using a horse to plow his field hit upon an interesting problem. I contend that the horse is clearly being exploited in this situation; it is being forced to labor on behalf of the farmer. You might try and make the case that he could be well-cared for, but that doesn't dismiss the claim of exploitation; some human slaves were "nutured" in a similar fashion as well.

    Since the farmer is exploiting this animal, that he has no moral right to own, then it stands to reason that we should, as a society, do away with such practices. But what might the ramifications of that be? Those farmers could only compensate their loss of animal power with mechanized farm equipment, thereby increasing the environmental impact of their farming practices.

    Perhaps we say that those farmers, nay all farmers, should revert back to the days of maual labor. That way no animals are exploited and the enivronment does not suffer on their behalf either. The problem then becomes whether farmers then have the ability to produce farming yields on the same level as they previously could. While I won't rule this out as a possibility, it seems improbable that they could. Now this would not necessarily be a problem, as long as we are willing to submit large segments of our global human population to starvation (which is a sure-fire way to deal with the impending population crisis).

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  6. Shelby,
    I’m interested in examining the owner/guardian distinction further as well; perhaps we might combine research efforts. I think that all of the responsibilities remain in the transition from owner to guardian; what is different is the term guardian provides much more protection for the animal’s dignitary interests-the result is that we see the animal as having intrinsic worth, not economic value resulting from exploitation. In regard to the pig/horse examples, I think that an animal’s exploitation does not hinge on whether the animal is going to be slaughtered or not. I might also suggest that we examine the phrase “work harmoniously”. Perhaps it’s possible for animals and humans to live harmoniously (of course it is) with each other in a mutually beneficial relationship.

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  7. Brett,
    Might we briefly examine your reasoning?

    “Since the farmer is exploiting this animal, that he has no moral right to own, then it stands to reason that we should, as a society, do away with such practices.”

    Whether the farmer has a moral right to own an animal is secondary to the treatment of the animal. In all cases, the primary concern is the welfare of the animal. Exploitation is not a property of the thing or sentient being exploited. So, you are correct, as a society we need to do away with exploitation; regardless of who or what is being exploited. It is the human act of exploiting that needs to be abolished, not modified, abolished.

    “But what might the ramifications of that be?”

    Two of the most obvious and positive consequences resulting from the abolition of exploitation and oppression are, the abolishment of slavery and equal rights for women and minorities. In this specific case, you are setting us up for a false dichotomy and a slippery slope fallacy (See “The Philosophy Toolkit”).

    “Those farmers could only compensate their loss of animal power with mechanized farm equipment, thereby increasing the environmental impact of their farming practices.”

    In the age of modern rational human: are you suggesting that we “only” have the choice of animal drawn ploughs or farm equipment that is harmful to the environment?

    This argument is reminiscent of the plantation owner’s insistence that if slavery were abolished, the fall of our economy would surely follow. These are not either or scenarios; there are many options available to inventive creatures such as ourselves. Consider that some farmers in Wisconsin are using canola oil to power tractors, and new green technology is rapidly making its way to American farms. (Suggested research: green farm technology)

    “Perhaps we say that those farmers, nay all farmers, should revert back to the days of maual labor. That way no animals are exploited and the enivronment does not suffer on their behalf either. The problem then becomes whether farmers then have the ability to produce farming yields on the same level as they previously could. While I won't rule this out as a possibility, it seems improbable that they could. Now this would not necessarily be a problem, as long as we are willing to submit large segments of our global human population to starvation (which is a sure-fire way to deal with the impending population crisis).”

    This paragraph is a textbook example of a slippery slope fallacy. It seems highly unlikely that “large segments of our global human population” will starve to death if we are faced with figuring out how to move a plough absent the animal. And, in a Lockian sense, a little manual labor might be good for us; and Marx might suggest that everyone reconnect with the land for a few hours a day. Perhaps community farming makes sense. After all we are sustaining ourselves, we should not be relying on animals for our sustenance.

    We are the most rational beings on the planet; the only animals capable of reason as Kant says (I don’t agree here, but we seem to have the highest degree of capacity for reason) and yet we do some of the most irrational and counter-intuitive things. Why: for profit… …for comfort, for convenience? And, as human animals, we are also victims of our own exploitative practices. As Kant says, we must “practice kindness towards animals” if we are not to stifle our feelings, and “He who is cruel to animals becomes cruel also in his dealings with men [persons].

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  8. Brett’s argument in his first paragraph is sound. He clearly makes the association between the exploitation of people and animals. Then the argument seems to shift gears from this recognition, to a favoring of exploitation against certain groups (in this case the animal group). This is a difficult position to defend and a potentially dangerous position in practice, as history has shown.

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  9. There's a lot going on here. Keane, I think you were trying to help me distinguish "work harmoniously" from "live harmoniously in a mutually beneficial relationship?" I'm not entirely sure what the difference would be. I'm thinking of the relationship between birds and elephants. The birds eat the bugs on the elephant, and both parties benefit because the bird gets a meal and the elephant doesn't have to put up with bugs. I see this as similar--though a little less pure--in a farmer using a horse to plow a field. The horse is fed with the crop that he's plowing, and ensured that he is well taken care of, and the farmer gets the crop to feed his family with and sell. I suppose this is a moot point since very few farms (in developed countries, at least) use horse or animal power.

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  10. Not a moot point at all. And I think the term “work harmoniously” is fine in the birds and elephants example, as everything is a working system. But, when humans are using animals whether to plow a field or jump through a ring of fire; I am skeptical of using the term “work” in those types of situations. When I say “live harmoniously in a mutually beneficial relationship”, I am not referring to any type of labor, or favors. I mean that animals and humans enrich each other’s lives simply by maintaining a close and loving relationship. In your horse example, the farmer is “using a horse”, this is not something natural for the horse; wild horses are “broken” and “tamed” for our usage.

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